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Abstract 
 
 This paper addresses a major omission in the way textbook writers and journalists 
utilize Adam Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand” to make Adam Smith an intellectual 
precursor of modern neo-liberal economic policy.  Specifically, the paper addresses the 
use of the concept of the “invisible hand” by Adam Smith to address two major issues in 
the debate over neo-liberal policy:  the international flow of capital and its role in the 
location of investment projects and the inequality in the distribution of income that might 
result from certain policies. 
 
 The neo-liberal mantra about Adam Smith’s invisible hand asserts that so long as 
there is sufficient competition and no government intervention beyond the protection of 
life, liberty and property, the pursuit of individual self interest will result in an 
improvement in the aggregate well being of society as a whole.  This is true even if 
investments are made overseas and if economic inequality increases.  Aside from some 
contributions to the professional literature, virtually everyone else who writes about the 
invisible hands ignores what Adam Smith actually said.  This paper restates what Smith 
said when he used the term “invisible hand” in both The Wealth of Nations and in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments.  It places his use of the term in context to illustrate how far 
Smith departs from the distortions of his neo-liberal self-described admirers. 
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The head of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, N. 
Gregory Mankiw, stepped into a hornets’ nest when he asserted that outsourcing (the 
decision of American businesses to locate production facilities outside of the United 
States) was good for the American economy.  Modern followers of Adam Smith leapt to 
his defense.  They argued that no matter where businesses chose to make investments, if 
they were constrained by competition, the result would be increased efficiency (and thus 
economic growth) on a world scale.  Even Americans who lost their jobs as a result of 
those business decisions would benefit.  When the television commentator Lou Dobbs 
began the series “Exporting America,” he was attacked as a “protectionist” and 
admonished that he should know better because he had studied Adam Smith. 
 
Adam Smith is rightly credited with creating the first full-scale economic 
treatise.1  He is also considered the father of “laissez-faire” economics because of his 
denunciation of the mercantilist rules and regulations that he considered inimical to the 
economic development of nations.  Though he qualified his belief that the competitive 
market would maximize the growth of the “wealth of nations,” he has in fact been hailed 
as the theoretical harbinger of modern neo-liberalism2 (a peculiar version of laissez-faire 
economics to be sure3).   The leap from Smith’s work to that set of policies is 
unwarranted – in fact it can only be sustained by a distortion of Smith.  That distortion 
will become apparent through an investigation of the references in The Wealth of Nations 
and The Theory of Moral Sentiments to the concept of the “invisible hand.” 
 
The idea of the invisible hand is quite rightly described as an essential concept for 
any effort to learn from human behavior, that is, to create social science.4  However, the 
use of that concept both in the teaching of economics today and in the common sense 
understanding that is bruited about by journalists goes much further than that.  Today in 
thousands of classrooms every year (not only in economics courses) the concept of the 
invisible hand is used to advance something like the following set of propositions: 
 
1) If individuals (it may get tricky, but this concept includes both corporate entities 
as legal “persons” and human beings)5 are left free to pursue their own self-
interest by employing the resources they control to maximize their incomes, they 
will be led, as if by an invisible hand, to maximize the nation’s, indeed, the 
world’s income as well as the future growth of that income through their 
interaction with other self-interested individuals. 
 
2) The framework necessary for the results of proposition (1) to be achieved includes 
the requirement that these individuals, human and corporate, must be constrained 
by the process of competition – that is, individuals interacting as described in 
proposition (1) will achieve those positive results for society as a whole because if 
they do not use resources efficiently and provide the highest quality services 
and/or products possible, their competitors will.  (This competitive process needs 
to occur in both factor markets and the markets for goods and services.) 
 
3) As a corollary of proposition (2), such competition must be permitted across 
national boundaries.  There is no justification for limiting the scope of 
competition in the sale of goods, services and factors of production to the national 
boundaries of a nation.6 
 
4)  In order to induce the self-interested individuals to employ their resources in the 
most efficient manner, government must at the very least protect people (human 
and corporate) in their ownership of those resources and also protect them in the 
enjoyment of the fruits of successful utilization of those resources.  Thus, 
government must prohibit slavery, murder, robbery and fraud, but it also must 
prohibit confiscation of both privately owned capital as well as the profits from 
capital investments. 
 
5) Governments must strive to minimize restrictions on the production, trading, 
selling and ultimate consumption of goods and services (including the services of 
factors of production), relying on the competition described in proposition (2) to 
act as the invisible hand which, history has shown, is much more efficient in 
identifying scarcity and preferences than any government decision-making unit. 
 
6) The justification for the conclusion that government is less efficient than private 
decision-making units is because government is not subjected to the invisible 
hand.  There are no competitive pressures on government decision-makers.  There 
are no rewards of profit to provide incentives to be excellent and there are no 
punishments in the form of losses and perhaps bankruptcy to discourage 
inefficient, wasteful, behavior. 
 
Since Adam Smith was specifically concerned with the various mercantilist 
restrictions on the behavior of economic decision-makers, it stands to reason that 
supporters of free markets, free trade, free flows of capital (in short, the modern neo-
liberal mantra) would emphasize Smith’s conclusions about the positive results of 
what he called the “system of natural liberty” (II, 208)7 and suggest that his analysis 
forms the basis for all six of the above propositions.  However, one particular element 
of the neo-liberal policy mix is decidedly absent from Adam Smith’s discussion.  In 
fact, when he explicitly discusses the “invisible hand” in the Wealth of Nations he 
emerges as totally opposed to the modern policies which support and encourage the 
free international flow of capital. 
 
To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to situate the “invisible hand” reference 
in its appropriate context.  First of all, the positive theoretical contributions of Adam 
Smith are developed in the first two books of the Wealth of Nations.8  That is where 
we learn about the powerful dynamic created by the division of labor and the role of 
capital accumulation in creating wealth and economic growth.  We also learn of the 
role of competition.  Book III is a short history of agriculture in Europe up to Smith’s 
time.9  In book IV, Smith turns to the two “systems of political economy” that were 
current in his time; the one he called “system of commerce” is what we know as the 
doctrine of mercantilism.10  It is in his attempt to refute mercantilism that Smith 
explicitly calls on the “invisible hand.” 
 
In chapter 2 of book IV, Smith argues that restraining the importation of goods 
from abroad so as to afford domestic producers “the monopoly of the home market” 
will not increase total output.  The reason he gives is that output “… of the society 
never can exceed what the capital of the society can employ.”(I:  474, 475)11  Thus, 
by increasing production in the protected industry a nation merely succeeds in 
moving resources from other industries.  The modern formulation of this analysis 
argues that such protectionism increases the production of goods in which the nation 
is relatively less efficient while decreasing the production of goods for which the 
nation’s resources are more appropriately suited.  In an effort to demonstrate that his 
“system of natural liberty” produces the maximum possible benefit from the point of 
view of increasing the wealth of a nation, Smith argues that it is totally unnecessary to 
force upon business owners a direction of their capital to the home market.  Smith’s 
reasoning behind this gives occasion for his use of the “invisible hand” metaphor. 
 
Despite numerous references in the professional literature, this aspect of how 
Smith actually uses the “invisible hand” concept is not emphasized in the major 
treatises on the History of Economic Thought and is completely ignored in casual 
usage.  In Principles textbooks and in popularizations something akin to the six 
propositions above is stated as the essence of the invisible hand analysis.12  This is 
despite the existence of an excellent article by Joseph Persky from the 1989 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives.13  Thus, an extensive quotation to revisit this issue is very 
much in order. 
  
No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society 
beyond what its capital can maintain.  It can only divert a part of it into a direction 
into which it might not otherwise have gone: and it is by no means certain that 
this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that 
into which it would have gone of its own accord. 
 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command … the study of his own 
advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment 
which is most advantageous to the society.  First, every individual endeavours to 
employ his capital as near home as he can, and consequently as much as he can in 
the support of domestic industry … 
 
Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestic 
industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its produce may be 
of the greatest possible value … 
 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to 
render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. … 
 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only 
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
of his intention.(I:  475-7)14 
 
It is clear from this passage what Smith does NOT mean when he refers to the 
invisible hand.  Instead of suggesting that international capital flows in search of foreign 
investments would be a perfectly acceptable method by which to enhance the wealth of a 
particular nation, Smith is making a detailed practical argument that because of the costs 
of supervising investments overseas, because of the time involved in turning over capital 
employed in foreign trade as opposed to domestic trade, the operation of the invisible 
hand in the context of the 18th century would naturally tend to favor domestic investment 
and therefore the economic development of the nation. 
 
  Examining Smith’s discussion of the rare occurrence which will naturally draw 
capital to what he calls “distant” employments, we can see the main reason why he favors 
domestic investments over foreign.  His standard for investment from the point of view of 
society is the amount of “productive labor” that is “maintained” by that capital.15  Smith 
admits that there might be a rare occurrence where a high prospective rate of profit will 
be “higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference which is given to 
nearer employments.”(II: 145)  In this case, it is important that capital flow to these 
“distant employments” because the high profits being earned there are creating a situation 
which damages domestic business due to the high prices being paid for the products from 
abroad.  Smith writes, “Though the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of 
productive labour in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant employment may be 
as necessary for the welfare of the society as a near one, the goods which the distant 
employment deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer 
employments.”(Ibid.)  Smith’s point is that only with the outflow of capital to those 
foreign points of production will the increased competition reduce the prices being 
charged to domestic consumers of those goods.  In this sentence we see both the 
advantage Smith believes exists from employing capital domestically as well as the 
limited reasons why the employment of capital in “distant” markets might be necessary.  
This exception is far from an endorsement of modern free capital flows. 
 
To further illustrate this point, we should note Smith’s discussion of the negative 
impact on Britain of the Navigation Acts, which monopolized the trade with North 
America for British industry and merchants.  He noted that such a monopoly artificially 
diverts capital from activities that are more important, those that “maintain … the greatest 
quantity of productive labor.”(II: 114)  The Navigation Acts diverted capital to long 
distance trade with the North American colonies rather than domestic manufacturing, the 
home (coastal) trade, or trade with closer markets as in Europe.16  The idea that such far 
flung investments would almost never be preferred by domestic investors absent the 
artificial acts of government led Smith to conclude that colonies, themselves were a 
burden from which Britain “derives nothing but loss.”(II: 131)17  
 
Thus, the idea that large corporate enterprises would become the most important 
form of business organization and that they would become multinational and voluntarily 
invest capital all over the world without national preference would have been 
inconceivable to Adam Smith.  The one example of such internationally oriented 
enterprises in Smith’s day were the various trading companies set up by European nations 
and granted a monopoly of trade between the home country and various colonial 
acquisitions particularly in east Asia but elsewhere as well.  Here he is unsparing in his 
condemnation both of the value of such companies to the home country and of the 
behavior of such companies in the regions they control.  On the first point, Smith argues 
that for some countries, the existence of such companies creates trade where no trade 
would exist whereas for other countries such companies restrict trade to less than would 
exist.  He concludes, “Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is 
necessarily hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from a 
particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting towards a 
particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it.”(II: 148)  
 
On the second point, Smith waxes eloquently indignant, noting that the Dutch are 
stripping their east Asian colonies of clove and nutmeg trees, causing the population to 
fall.18  In India, the British East India Company’s servants were known 
 
…to order a peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice or 
some other grain.  The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the 
real reasons, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a large 
quantity of opium, which he happened then to have upon hand.  Upon other 
occasions the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other grain has 
been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of poppies; when the 
chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium. (II: 153)19 
 
The modern giant, multinational, corporation was prefigured in the institution of 
the joint-stock company.  Smith criticized such companies because “owners” cared little 
about the company since they risked only their investment and members of the Board of 
Directors did little for the company because they knew virtually nothing about the 
business.  Meanwhile, the actual managers of the company because they were dealing 
with “other people’s money” were likely to practice “[n]eligience and profusions… It is 
upon this account that joint stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been able to 
maintain the competition against private adventurers.  They have, accordingly, very 
seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeeded with 
one”(II: 265) 
 
Smith went further and argued that giving such a corporation political control 
over a colony (he used India and the East India Company as his prime example) would 
produce perverse economic incentives for individuals associated with it.  The directors 
actually would have little interest in the actual prosperity of India (and even of the 
company itself) but would, instead, desire to buy their way onto the board in order to 
arrange for “friends” to be appointed to jobs in India where they could engage in the kind 
of individualized plunder that the supposed “owners” back home in Britain were 
powerless to prevent.20  Once such an individual had succeeded in placing friends in such 
potentially lucrative jobs,  
 
… he frequently cares little about the dividend; or even upon the value of the 
stock … About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of which 
that vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all.  No other sovereigns ever 
were, or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent upon the 
happiness or misery of their subjects …(II: 276) 
 
It is clear from these passages, that Smith saw the kind of world embraced by the 
neo-liberal analysis as not at all conducive to the “wealth of nations.”  He argued that 
absent the monopolies provided by government, investors would first look close to home 
for investments.  Meanwhile, people in other countries would presumably do the same.  
When trade would occur, it would occur in ways that were mutually beneficial.  These 
other countries would not and should not, according to Smith, be subject to the 
misconduct of the servants of companies like the Dutch and British East India 
Companies. 
 
The world that Smith described is no more.  The 19th century saw the 
transformation of how American society conceptualized corporations.  Early in that 
century the grant of corporate charters was considered “a special privilege conferred by 
the state for the pursuit of public purposes”21 just as in Smith’s day.  This changed by the 
1870s as states replaced the practice of issuing specific acts of incorporation with more 
general incorporation laws making organizing businesses in that form more routine.  Still, 
in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court held that the 14th Amendment to 
the Constitution did not include corporations within the group of “persons” receiving 
“equal protection.”22   The view about the “personhood” of corporations began to change.   
In 1882, the Court agreed with the oral argument by a lawyer appearing before it that 
when Congress wrote the 14th Amendment they were explicitly interested in applying the 
concept of persons not just to human beings but also to corporations.23  By the early 20th 
century, corporations had achieved much of the rights bestowed upon individuals by the 
14th Amendment while retaining the privilege of being a “supra-individualistic entity.”24   
The Supreme Court did hold in 1904 that there were certain advantages that accrued to 
businesses utilizing the corporate form of organization, and it was that rationale that led 
the Court to permit the imposition of a corporate income tax (and this was before the 
Constitutional Amendment that permitted income taxation of individuals).  However the 
principles of limited liability and legal personhood created a new concentration of power 
in the market economies of the world that would have dismayed Adam Smith.  He had 
vigorously opposed such concentrations of power and privilege in the 18th century.  He 
would have recognized that the spread of the corporate form of business organization had 
universalized the government granted privileges, which he had strongly criticized.  In 
such a context, he might have been led to conclude that his “system of natural liberty” 
was being seriously eroded by the rise of these powerful entities. 
 
And what about the alleged natural preference for domestic investments?  Today, 
instantaneous communication permits investors to keep track of their capital all over the 
world.  Thus, there is no advantage of supervision that would lead an investor in New 
York, to prefer a Boston location to a location in Singapore for either a factory or a 
customer service bank of telephones.  International enforcement of the rights to private 
property make, for example, oil investments safe in Venezuela and Indonesia as well as 
in Texas (assuming the “wrong” government does not come to power in either of the 
foreign countries).  Convertibility of currencies makes it possible for Chileans, Kuwaitis 
and Poles to send their capital to American, Swiss or German banks with no disadvantage 
whatsoever.  These developments change the facts that led Smith to the conclusion that 
the invisible hand leads investors to the best possible employ of their personal capital so 
as to maximize the productive employment of their fellow citizens in domestic industry.  
The internationalization of capital markets, as Joseph Stiglitz made clear in Globalization 
and Its Discontents has had a profoundly destabilizing impact on the pursuit of wealth for 
many nations.  “Western banks benefited from the loosening of capital market controls in 
Latin America and Asia, but those regions suffered when inflows of speculative hot 
money … that had poured into countries suddenly reversed.  The abrupt outflow of 
money left behind collapsed currencies and weakened banking systems.”25  This is hardly 
the process Adam Smith was talking about when he touted the role of the invisible hand. 
 
Lest we believe that the complaints about multinational enterprises raised by 
Smith were really complaints about government-granted monopolies in the strict sense of 
a one-firm industry, we should recall the important political roles of major international 
corporations throughout the 20th century and continuing to this day.  Firestone Rubber 
was not granted a monopoly by the United States government for developing the rubber 
plantations of Liberia during the 20th century, nor did it enjoy a monopoly in the sale of 
rubber to American markets.  However, within Liberia it did get concessions – from that 
government.  Though the United States government did not grant a monopoly to the 
United Fruit company in Central America, it did come to its defense on Cold War 
pretexts to help overthrow the elected government of Guatemala in 1954 when that 
government proposed to nationalize some underutilized land owned by that company.  
The overthrow of the nationalist Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 is too well documented to 
deserve more than a passing mention, but the entire interaction between governments and 
international oil companies has been a central feature of the history of the Middle East 
with all its military and political conflicts since World War I. 
 
   That interaction continues today. The United States government has awarded a 
no-bid monopoly contract to the Halliburton Corporation for overseeing the 
reconstruction efforts of the Iraqi oil fields, and, as Adam Smith, himself would have 
predicted, the first evidence of overcharging and kickbacks has already hit the 
newspapers.26  The complaints of Adam Smith about the actions of the Dutch and British 
East India Companies can find echoes throughout the 20th century as well as in the few 
short years of the current one if we are careful enough to look for them in their more 
modern forms. 
 
SMITH ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME:  MORE DEPARTURE 
FROM NEO-LIBERALISM 
 
Smith referred to the invisible hand once in his earlier work The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.  Here he argued that despite the desire to accumulate vast riches, individuals 
who were in a position to do so were forced to  
 
… divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements.  They [owners] are 
led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of 
life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions 
among all its inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, … advance the interest of 
the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.27  
 
Here again, we see Adam Smith’s disagreement with the neo-liberal paradigm.  
Modern economics is predicated in part on the principle that issues of efficiency can, at 
least theoretically, be separated from those of equity.  In other words, one can judge the 
efficiency of an economic situation without inquiring as to the distribution of income and 
well being among the population.  The concept of Pareto efficiency is achieved when it is 
impossible to make any person better off without making at least one other person worse 
off.28  This laissez faire approach to economics has often been supplemented with the 
view that if the nation decides (as a matter of morality) that the distribution of income in 
a particular Pareto efficient situation is unacceptable, then such a nation can engage in 
whatever redistribution of income it wishes to in order to achieve a more equitable result.  
However, those who make this argument usually urge that such a program of re-
distribution not interfere with the way the competitive market place allocates resources.  
Following Henry Simons, who argued that the only correct form of taxation was an 
income tax which was totally neutral in terms of its effect on the allocation of resources, 
this argument attempts to clearly separate efforts to make the economy as efficient as 
possible from efforts to achieve some standard of equity in the distribution of income.29 
 
Modern neo-liberalism takes the stronger position that it is virtually impossible to 
redistribute income without negatively impacting efficiency.  This trend of thought 
emphasizes the incentive problems created by government redistribution activity.  First of 
all, in opposition to Simons, it is argued that the very act of taxation based on income, 
especially if rates are graduated, is harmful to the incentives of workers, savers and 
investors.  The result is a reduced supply of labor, less savings and less risk-taking than 
would exist absent that taxation.  Second, subsidizing non-work through governmental 
mandated charity to the poor, especially to able-bodied adults capable of working, has a 
negative impact on the willingness of individuals to offer their labor in the marketplace.  
The availability of such subsidies might also reduce the pressure on those currently 
employed to apply intense diligence to the carrying out of tasks for which they were 
hired.  Nevertheless, even according to modern neo-liberals, some minimal re-
distribution of income by government is required, as the Council of Economic Advisors 
in the first Reagan administration concluded.30  Because of the dangerous incentive 
effects, however, it was explicitly asserted during Reagan’s first term that such 
redistribution should be limited to the “truly needy.”31  In 1994, the Republicans captured 
control of Congress under the banner of the “Contract with America” which had 
promised to re-invigorate the efforts begun by President Reagan to escape from the 
“failed policies of the past.”  The man destined to become Speaker of the House, Newt 
Gingrich, described those failed policies as the “redistributionist model of how wealth is 
created”32 – an approach he identified as the cause of all the problems facing the US 
economy – and in fact the society at large. 
 
Adam Smith on the other hand, as the above quote makes clear, believed that a 
relatively equal distribution of “the necessaries of life” would be in the best interest of 
society as a whole.  In the Wealth of Nations, Smith strongly supported the need to 
achieve a decent standard of living for the lower ranks,33 even going so far as to 
recommend that schools be set up at public expense that even the children of “the 
common people” could afford to attend them.(II: 306)34  In his belief that such an equal 
distribution of the “necessaries of life” is essential for the well-being of society as a 
whole, Smith is clearly more closely aligned with the US Catholic Bishops who in 1985 
issued their Pastoral on the US Economy, Economic Justice for All,35 than with his neo-
liberal admirers.  In that report, the Bishops recommended a national commitment to 
providing all people with food, shelter, education, employment and medical care, in 
effect, fleshing out what Smith’s “necessaries of life” actually meant in concrete terms 
for the late 20th century.36  Many economists who subscribe to neo-liberalism reacted in 
horror to the Bishops’ report.  They argued that the Bishops were creating a blueprint for 
a “statist” solution to economic problems and that such solutions would be a prescription 
for more not less poverty.  In short, they made the same claim Gingrich made a decade 
later – that the “redistributionist” approach to economic problems would only make 
matters worse.37   
 
Instead of guaranteeing people jobs, food, medical care, etc. the neo-liberal 
approach is based on the idea that people should instead be guaranteed the opportunity to 
develop their individual skills and then be guaranteed the opportunity to offer themselves 
in the marketplace so they could earn the wherewithal to purchase housing, food, medical 
care, etc.  In other words, the neo-liberal approach requires opportunity to participate 
fully in the market place but cannot require that government be responsible for insuring 
any particular result of that participation.  Of course, most neo-liberals are not heartless, 
uncharitable ogres.  As individuals they may be quite generous.  However, they do not 
believe it is the function of government to guarantee results.  At the end of the day, those 
individuals who are truly needy do deserve official help from the government, but it must 
be carefully calibrated so as not to do more harm than good, as the old AFDC system 
allegedly did before it was “reformed” in 1997. 
 
Because neo-liberalism starts with a strong disapproval of official government 
redistribution of income, the increased inequality of income in many third world 
countries as a result of policies adopted over the past 20 years has not given neo-liberal 
intellectuals or policy-makers much pause.  As Joseph Stiglitz so clearly shows in 
Globalization and its Discontents,38 officials of the IMF and elsewhere continued to 
recommend policies that they knew would increase inequality and the suffering of lower 
income people in many of the countries they were advising.  They believed that such 
“medicine” was necessary to cure what ailed those economies.  By recommending 
reduced government subsidies, the end to government deficit spending, the reining in of 
inflation and turning balance of payments deficits into surpluses, the were attempting to 
force these countries to adopt policies that would let the invisible hand (as described 
above in the six propositions) work its will. 
 
It is clear that Adam Smith, at least the Smith of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
believed that the invisible hand was already at work guaranteeing the necessities of life 
for the poor.  How quaint Smith’s idea appears today.39  He was, of course, describing a 
landlord with a landed estate who could only eat so much of the food grown on it.  
However, his own discussion of the misconduct of the officials of the British and Dutch 
East India Companies showed what would be possible under certain circumstances (he 
believed these to be unnatural circumstances in his day and age).  He noted that the Dutch 
seemed to have no trouble artificially reducing the production of the necessities of life so 
that, in fact, the population itself was declining.  Similarly, the British had no problem 
reducing the production of food so as to increase the opium crop (destined for export).  In 
the Wealth of Nations, Smith had come to believe that “… the silent and insensible 
operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about…” a situation 
which permitted well off individuals an opportunity to  
 
… exchange the whole surplus produce of their lands, … without sharing it either 
with tenants or retainers.  All for ourselves and nothing for other people, seems, in 
every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind.  
As soon, therefore, as they could find a method of consuming the whole value of 
their rents themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any other 
persons.” (I: 437) 
 
Thus, what appeared as the work of the invisible hand in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (written 18 years before the Wealth of Nations) was no longer operative. 
 
Based on the totality of Smith’s analysis – especially his specific examples of the 
role of the invisible hand and his criticisms of the international corporations of his day, 
one can make a very strong case that some kind of restrictions, even the “mercantilist” 
ones that Smith attacked in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations, may be just the kind of 
government actions necessary to protect national economies (even advanced economies 
like the US) from the depredations of the “servants” of giant corporations (recall the 
Enron debacle) and the destabilizing impact of “free flowing capital.”   Smith would also 
have recoiled in horror from the gross inequalities that the world has experienced in the 
previous two centuries, as some nations have grown extremely wealthy.  Based on his 
belief in the importance of some semblance of equality at least in the distribution of the 
“necessaries of life,” he would have looked at the world today and condemned it 
asserting, “This is not what I expected from the invisible hand.”  Rereading his 
condemnations of the inefficiencies created by joint-stock companies and the oppressions 
visited upon British India and the Netherlands East Indies, we do not believe it too much 
of a stretch to imagine that Dr. Smith, himself, were he writing today, would be 
supporting the efforts of the various groups and individuals who regularly gather in 
protest against the negative impacts of globalization, neo-liberal style.    
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